dc.contributor.author | KARLINGER, Liliane | |
dc.contributor.author | MOTTA, Massimo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-24T12:22:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-24T12:22:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7255 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider an incumbent firm and a more effcient entrant, both
offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent
disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero
at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate.
We analyze different price schemes (uniform pricing, implicit price discrimination
- or rebates, explicit price discrimination) and show that the
schemes which - for given market structure - induce lower equilibrium
prices are also those under which the incumbent is more likely to exclude
the rival | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/30 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | L11 | en |
dc.subject | L14 | en |
dc.subject | L42 | en |
dc.title | Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | KARLINGER|Liliane|aut| | |
dc.neeo.contributor | MOTTA|Massimo|aut| | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |