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dc.contributor.authorKARLINGER, Liliane
dc.contributor.authorMOTTA, Massimo
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-24T12:22:26Z
dc.date.available2007-10-24T12:22:26Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/7255
dc.description.abstractWe consider an incumbent firm and a more effcient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate. We analyze different price schemes (uniform pricing, implicit price discrimination - or rebates, explicit price discrimination) and show that the schemes which - for given market structure - induce lower equilibrium prices are also those under which the incumbent is more likely to exclude the rivalen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/30en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectL11en
dc.subjectL14en
dc.subjectL42en
dc.titleExclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Mattersen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorKARLINGER|Liliane|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorMOTTA|Massimo|aut|
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