dc.contributor.author | VIGNOLO, Thierry | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-24T12:43:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-24T12:43:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7257 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational
games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which
are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run
players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against.
We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium
associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/31 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | C72 | en |
dc.subject | C73 | en |
dc.subject | L1 | en |
dc.subject | Reputation | en |
dc.subject | Long-run equilibria | en |
dc.subject | Selective matching | en |
dc.subject | Games with an outside option | en |
dc.title | Imitation and Selective Matching In Reputational Games | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | VIGNOLO|Thierry|aut| | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |