Integration through law and its discontents : unveiling the distributive impact of judge-made law in the EU

Abstract

In a context of growing anxiety about globalisation and social inequality, debates on the allocation of benefits and burdens of European integration are commonplace. Despite the key role that the Court of Justice of the European Union played in the process, little attention has been given to the way in which its doctrines and decisions benefit some groups at the expense of others. This thesis maps the ways in which the phenomenon of Integration through Law affects the distribution of wealth and income. Using four different field studies (the Common Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy, Direct Taxation, and Student Mobility), it analyses the conflicts of interests present in each policy, how they translate into (unequal) litigation strategies, and how the Court resolves such conflicts. In doing so, this research illustrates how the case law of the Court is both the result and the cause of distributive conflicts. It also unveils the Court’s own assumptions about how benefits and burdens should be allocated across the subjects of EU law. The thesis concludes that distributive conflicts are not an exceptional or recent phenomenon, but endogenous to Integration through Law. Judicial decisions bear a distributive impact in ways that are particular to each policy field, but usually to the detriment of the have-nots and those already disadvantaged by the policy-making process. In this context European Union law, and judge-made law, should be included in discussions on social inequality and liberated from the assumption that they are neutral and a vector of social unity.