Autonomous algorithmic collusion : economic research and policy implications

ASSAD, Stephanie; CALVANO, Emilio; CALZOLARI, Giacomo; CLARK, Robert; DENICOLÒ, Vincenzo; ERSHOV, Daniel; JOHNSON, Justin; PASTORELLO, Sergio; RHODES, Andrew; XU, Lei; WILDENBEEST, Matthijs

doi:10.1093/oxrep/grab011

2021

Article

ASSAD, Stephanie; CALVANO, Emilio; CALZOLARI, Giacomo EUI affiliated

; CLARK, Robert; DENICOLÒ, Vincenzo; ERSHOV, Daniel; JOHNSON, Justin; PASTORELLO, Sergio; RHODES, Andrew; XU, Lei; WILDENBEEST, Matthijs

Oxford review of economic policy, 2021, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 459–478

Cite

ASSAD, Stephanie, CALVANO, Emilio, CALZOLARI, Giacomo, CLARK, Robert, DENICOLÒ, Vincenzo, ERSHOV, Daniel, JOHNSON, Justin, PASTORELLO, Sergio, RHODES, Andrew, XU, Lei, WILDENBEEST, Matthijs, Autonomous algorithmic collusion : economic research and policy implications, Oxford review of economic policy, 2021, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 459–478 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/73707

Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository

Markets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with artificial intelligence (AI), that have the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy.

Additional information:

Published online: 23 September 2021

Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/73707

Full-text via DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/grab011

ISSN: 0266-903X; 1460-2121

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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