Exploiting rivals' strengths

dc.contributor.author	CALZOLARI, Giacomo
dc.contributor.author	DENICOLÒ, Vincenzo
dc.date.accessioned	2022-01-21T09:30:00Z
dc.date.available	2022-01-21T09:30:00Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/73727
dc.description.abstract	Contracts that reference rivals' volumes (RRV contracts), such as exclusive dealing or market-share rebates, have been a long-standing concern in antitrust because of their possible exclusionary effects. We show, however, that it is more profitable to use these contracts to exploit rivals rather than to foreclose them. By optimally designing RRV contracts, a dominant firm may, indeed, obtain higher profits than if it were an unchallenged monopolist. In the most favorable cases, it can earn as much as if it could eliminate the competition and acquire the rivals' specific technological capabilities free of charge.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	CEPR	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	CEPR Discussion Papers	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2020/15520	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	en
dc.title	Exploiting rivals' strengths	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
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