Date: 2002
Type: Contribution to book
The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics
Eric BROUSSEAU and Jean-Michel GLACHANT (eds), The economics of contracts : theories and applications, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-42
BROUSSEAU, Eric, GLACHANT, Jean-Michel, FARES, M'Hand, The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics, in Eric BROUSSEAU and Jean-Michel GLACHANT (eds), The economics of contracts : theories and applications, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-42
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74037
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
To an economist, a contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior – a bilateral coordination arrangement. Of course, this formulation touches on the legal concept of the contract (a meeting of minds creating effects in law), but also transcends it. Over the course of the past thirty years, the “contract” has become a central notion in economic analysis (section 2), giving rise to three principal fields of study: “incentives,” “incomplete contracts,” and “transaction costs” (section 3). This opened the door to a revitalization of our understanding of the operation of market economies … and of the practitioner's “toolbox” (section 4). The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of recent developments in these analytical currents, to present their various aspects (section 5), and to propose expanding horizons (section 6). The potential of these approaches, which have fundamentally impacted on many areas of economic analysis in recent decades, is far from exhausted. This is evinced by the contributions in this book, which draw on a variety of methodological camps and disciplines.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74037
Full-text via DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511613807.001
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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