dc.contributor.author | JONES, Erik | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-11T10:57:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-11T10:57:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Contemporary Italian politics, 2021, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 196-209 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 2324-8823 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2324-8831 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74048 | |
dc.description | Published online: 14 April 2021 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Italy’s relationship with the rest of Europe began 2020 under a watchful eye. Although Giuseppe Conte’s second government was more pro-European than his first, European institutions (and bond markets) wondered whether the coalition was stable enough to undertake meaningful fiscal consolidation and institutional reforms. When the coronavirus struck, the tenor of the relationship changed completely. First, Italy felt abandoned by the rest of Europe – and not without reason – then Conte battled hard to ensure the rest of Europe would show solidarity. Thanks to Franco-German leadership, the rest of Europe delivered an unprecedented agreement to provide funding to help recover from the pandemic and to enhance resilience. At that point, doubts about whether Conte’s second government could deliver arose again. Divisions within the coalition deepened, and the year ended on a cliff hanger. This story has important implications for Italy, for Europe, and for how we understand the relationship between them. | en |
dc.format.medium | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Taylor and Francis | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Contemporary Italian politics | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | Italy and Europe : from competence to solidarity to competence | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/23248823.2021.1911617 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 13 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 196 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 209 | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | en |