Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorPETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T13:23:46Z
dc.date.available2007-10-30T13:23:46Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/7428
dc.description.abstractThis contribution argues that power-oriented, intergovernmental approaches to international economic law problems (e.g. trade sanctions in response to WTO violations) may offer less efficient and legally less effective instruments than citizen-oriented approaches (e.g. private judicial remedies in domestic courts in response to certain WTO violations). Realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constitutionalism offer complementary rather than mutually exclusive analytical approaches and policy strategies. One-sidedly power-oriented international law doctrines (as applied by Prof. Nzelibe) may lead to wrong policy conclusions; from a constitutional perspective, for instance, there are strong arguments in favor of reforming the WTO's enforcement mechanisms so as to better protect consumer welfare and other general citizen interests in open markets and judicial protection of rule of lawen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of St. Gallen Law School Law and Economics Working Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNo. 2007-19en
dc.titleWhy Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law - The Case for Reforming the WTO's Enforcement Mechanismen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


Files associated with this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record