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dc.contributor.authorBAQUERO CRUZ, Julio
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-01T08:43:55Z
dc.date.available2022-07-01T08:43:55Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.issn1725-6739
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/74716
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a detailed analysis of the judgment of the German Constitutional Court’s judgment in Weiss, and of its aftermath, put in their wider context. The article deals with the position of the judgment in the case law of the German Constitutional Court, its controversial use of the principle of proportionality, the interpretation of the prohibition of monetary financing, the possible implications of the decision for the Union’s budget, the impact on the European Central Bank and on the Union’s economic constitution, the implementation of the judgment, the consequences for the European Court of Justice and the rule of law in the Union, and its problematic democratic claims. While this decision has all the elements to foster a constitutional moment in the Union, its meaning and direction are not yet clear. The final section deals with the possible medium- and long-term influence on the Union legal order.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI LAWen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2022/10en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectGerman constitutional courten
dc.subjectPrimacyen
dc.subjectProportionalityen
dc.subjectEconomic constitutionen
dc.subjectDemocracyen
dc.titleKarlsruhe and its discontentsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International