Date: 2021
Type: Contribution to book
Political institutions and income taxes
Philipp GENSCHEL and Laura SEELKOPF (eds), Global taxation : how modern taxes conquered the world, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 178–198
ANDERSSON, Per F., Political institutions and income taxes, in Philipp GENSCHEL and Laura SEELKOPF (eds), Global taxation : how modern taxes conquered the world, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 178–198
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75039
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
The chapter analyses the link between political institutions and the adoption of income taxes. The main claim is that this link differs across different types of income tax. The personal income tax represents primarily an investment in fiscal capacity. Hence, its introduction depends crucially on political institutions that constrain executive power. The corporate income tax, by contrast, falls more heavily on the rich. As a consequence, its adoption depends critically on democratic institutions that allow for broad political participation. The chapter explores these predictions for a global sample of countries. The results support the contention that executive constraints facilitate personal income tax adoption, while corporate income taxes are more likely to be adopted by countries with broad suffrage rights.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75039
ISBN: 9780192897572; 9780191924019
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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