US-China competition, COVID-19 and democratic backsliding in Asia

Abstract

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic emergency has had a major impact in Asia – from South Asia, through Southeast Asia all the way to North Korea. It has allowed states to further centralize control over economic and social affairs – arguably also for good reasons – and has lent legitimacy to a recrudescence of nationalist and protectionist instincts, effectively empowering many of the region’s strongmen. The ripple effects of a post-pandemic depression, compounded by Russia’s war in Ukraine and the spectre of stagflation, are hard to discern. As popular discontent mounts, populist strongmen and democratic leaders alike have exhausted the charisma acquired through COVID-19 crisis-responses, ushering the way to two broad scenarios. A pessimistic outlook suggests further political decay and deepening geopolitical tensions as national interests more readily clash, and leadership seeks to divert attention from socio-economic grievances. Alternatively, contemporary history has demonstrated that genuine political evolution, new social compacts, redistributive political economies and multilateral systems of governance may acquire a new shine following a major crisis.1 Still, COVID-19 is among the factors that have widened the rift between the United States and China: US-China zero-sum interactions across the geopolitical, economic, technological and political domains have spiralled towards a race to the bottom in 2020. The Biden administration’s more nuanced approach, and more courteous rhetoric, towards Beijing hasn’t changed that dynamic. Lastly, at a time of crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine inflicted another crucial blow to the already precarious international system.