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dc.contributor.authorJONES, Erik
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-08T11:22:43Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationSurvival, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 175-184en
dc.identifier.issn0039-6338
dc.identifier.issn1468-2699
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/75314
dc.descriptionPublished online: 07 February 2023en
dc.description.abstractThe weakness of indispensable leaders is on full display in countries led by strongmen sitting atop authoritarian regimes, many of whom now appear embattled. The strength of democracy is that political leaders are systematically replaceable, particularly when they make mistakes. Neither US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy nor Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is indispensable. What matters for the United States and Italy is how good existing US and Italian constitutional arrangements are at self-correcting if they turn out to be poor leaders. Even in democracies, however, those who have power can be reluctant to surrender it. Leaders who presume themselves to be indispensable and seek to restructure political institutions to ensure they stay in power constitute a grave threat. What McCarthy and Meloni have done to gain power is less worrisome than what they might do to keep it.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherRoutledgeen
dc.relation.ispartofSurvivalen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessen
dc.titleThe weakness of indispensable leadersen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00396338.2023.2172868
dc.identifier.volume65en
dc.identifier.startpage175en
dc.identifier.endpage184en
dc.identifier.issue1en
dc.embargo.terms2024-07-07
dc.date.embargo2024-07-07


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