dc.contributor.author | JONES, Erik | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-08T11:22:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Survival, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 175-184 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-6338 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1468-2699 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75314 | |
dc.description | Published online: 07 February 2023 | en |
dc.description.abstract | The weakness of indispensable leaders is on full display in countries led by strongmen sitting atop authoritarian regimes, many of whom now appear embattled. The strength of democracy is that political leaders are systematically replaceable, particularly when they make mistakes. Neither US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy nor Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is indispensable. What matters for the United States and Italy is how good existing US and Italian constitutional arrangements are at self-correcting if they turn out to be poor leaders. Even in democracies, however, those who have power can be reluctant to surrender it. Leaders who presume themselves to be indispensable and seek to restructure political institutions to ensure they stay in power constitute a grave threat. What McCarthy and Meloni have done to gain power is less worrisome than what they might do to keep it. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Routledge | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Survival | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | The weakness of indispensable leaders | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/00396338.2023.2172868 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 65 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 175 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 184 | en |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en |
dc.embargo.terms | 2024-07-07 | |
dc.date.embargo | 2024-07-07 | |