Open Access
Reassessing the safeguards mess
Loading...
Files
RSCP_WP_2023_14.pdf (656.75 KB)
Full-text in Open Access
License
Attribution 4.0 International
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1028-3625
Issue Date
Type of Publication
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Citation
EUI; RSC; Working Paper; 2023/14; Global Governance Programme-498; [Global Economics]
Cite
HOEKMAN, Bernard M., MAVROIDIS, Petros C., Reassessing the safeguards mess, EUI, RSC, Working Paper, 2023/14, Global Governance Programme-498, [Global Economics] - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/75374
Abstract
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards was hailed as an important achievement of the Uruguay round, rightly so, given that it managed to outlaw the use of voluntary export restraints. Intended to facilitate the use of transparent, temporary, and non-discriminatory instruments to assist domestic industries injured by import competition, World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence undermined the realization of this objective. Worse, erratic case law created negative externalities, ranging from greater recourse to more discriminatory trade practices and use by the United States (US) of the types of managed trade that the Agreement of Safeguards was meant to abolish. As in the classic bootlegger-Baptist metaphor in the literature on regulation, the unintended consequence of WTO jurisprudence on safeguards has been more rather than less selective protection (discriminatory trade policies). As, if not more important, it made it more difficult for WTO members to use an instrument intended to assist governments in sustaining political support for an open trade regime. In this paper, we describe the source of discomfort and suggest ways to address it in a meaningful manner.