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dc.contributor.authorHERITIER, Adrienne
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-25T10:10:14Z
dc.date.available2023-09-25T10:10:14Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationInternational trade, politics and development, 2023, OnlineFirsten
dc.identifier.issn2632-122X
dc.identifier.issn2586-3932
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/75893
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to conceptualize and empirically illustrate the challenges that financial market regulation presents to politicians and the organization tasked with specifying regulations and supervising their implementation in the interest of users and consumers of financial instruments. It analyses the problem from the viewpoint of the governor's dilemma and the control/competence conflict, the linked problem of the rent-seeking of agents/intermediators and consumers of financial instruments. Political accountability problems are enhanced by the materiality of the technologies used, i.e. algo trading.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEmeralden
dc.relation.ispartofInternational trade, politics and developmenten
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.titleFinancial markets regulation : political accountability challengeden
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/ITPD-06-2023-0016
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International