Clientelism and electoral competition : the case of Chile’s municipalities

Abstract

Patronage is often considered a subtype of clientelism that arises through reciprocal arrangements between a politician and a citizen, where electoral support is rewarded with public employment. In Chile, there is evidence of clientelist practices at the municipal level. However, these studies have mainly had a qualitative focus. To complement these studies, this research aims to provide quantitative evidence using panel data and two-way fixed effects. Thus, we analyse the personnel hiring through the Mercado Público platform between 2009 and 2017 across the country’s 345 municipalities, finding evidence that support two hypotheses: (i) there is a political budget cycle, increasing spending by 14.9% during the election year and (ii) independent politicians spend less on hiring people than mayors who are militants of political parties, being this expenditure -9.8% less for independents than for the latter. These results seek to complement other research on clientelism and patronage in a context of the rise of independent politicians and citizen questioning of traditional political parties, as well as the relevance of public spending in local governments.