Essays in empirical political economy

Abstract

This thesis consists of three independent essays in applied political economy and historical economics. The first chapter examines a 2014 reform extending term limits for Italian mayors in towns with populations under 3,000 from two to three consecutive terms. Utilizing the unanticipated nature of the reform, I assessed its effect on local governance through three avenues: mayoral tenure, electoral accountability, and electoral selection. The results suggest a detrimental impact on voters' welfare. Specifically, there's a decline in the performance of third-term mayors in areas like investment spending speed and general administrative service provision. This decline could be due to dwindling motivation over extended tenures, with the role becoming monotonous. In the second chapter, co-authored with Nikolaj Broberg, we use the same reform to evaluate its impact on public finance. Mayors in their second term increased revenue via debt and channeled resources to prominent areas like waste management. Conversely, first-term mayors boosted revenue through asset sales and invested more in public housing. Our analysis suggests varying motivations: second-term mayors may be appeasing voters for re-election, while first-term mayors might be investing for future electoral gains or due to heightened re-election ambitions. This latter motivation seems more pronounced in southern Italy. The third chapter, co-written with Francesco Colombo and Marco Cozzani, explores the long-term effects of the World War I demographic upheaval on female labor force participation in Italy. Using the INPS database, we discovered that women born between 1916 and 1930 in areas with higher soldier casualties were likelier to enter the labor force. However, in municipalities with greater war exposure, women exhibited reduced earnings and lower divorce rates. This suggests that such regions might've seen subtler socio-cultural shifts due to compromised human capital investments.