dc.contributor.author | GIANNI, Letizia | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-01T07:10:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Florence : European University Institute, 2024 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77297 | |
dc.description | Defence date: 27 September 2024 | en |
dc.description | Examining Board: Prof. Giorgio Monti (European University Institute; Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, supervisor); Prof. Deirdre Curtin (Law Department, European University Institute); Prof. Susan Rose-Ackerman (Yale Law School, Yale University); Prof. Fernanda Nicola (Washington College of Law, American University) | en |
dc.description.abstract | Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) aims at cataloging the costs and benefits of different policy actions, to establish a comparison among them and decide how to proceed so that the benefits outweigh or (at least) equate to the costs. Over the years, CBA has captured the interest of many decision-makers, not least due to the simplicity of its rationale. In the US, both Republican and Democratic administrations have repeatedly confirmed the value of such analysis. The European Commission has traditionally been more sceptical on CBA, as many of the benefits of regulation – notably those relating to public health and the environment – may not be easily quantified in monetary terms. This study will show that the way the EU has envisaged the role of CBA in the ex-ante impact assessment of EU legislation leaves abundant space for improvement. First, looking at concrete examples of CBA documents produced by the Commission and its agencies, the CBA assessment exercise will oftentimes contradict the basic tenets of text-book CBA, reducing itself to a sequence of wordy statements instead of numeric evaluations. Second, in the absence of an explicit methodological approach agreed on at interservice and interinstitutional levels among the EU co-legislators, the different actors involved in EU rulemaking cannot really communicate among themselves to discuss the estimates of the costs and benefits identified in the assessment. Third, the enormous number of acts whose impacts the Commission is required to evaluate, generates a substantial administrative burden on EU administrators, with the paradox that to cut red tape results in additional red tape and inefficiencies. Fourth, the whole better regulation agenda package, along with any impact assessment documents, are enshrined in “soft law” acts, which are not legally binding and cannot be subject to judicial review by EU judges. To systematically identify the most eye-catching weaknesses of the use of CBA in EU rulemaking, this study puts forward a new theoretical framework, which will be named the “double-check theory”. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | LAW | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | PhD Thesis | en |
dc.relation.replaces | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77296 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Law -- European Union countries | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Administrative law -- European Union countries | en |
dc.subject.lcsh | Cost effectiveness | en |
dc.title | The use of cost-benefit analysis in EU administrative rulemaking | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2870/6536313 | en |
dc.embargo.terms | 2028-09-27 | |
dc.date.embargo | 2028-09-27 | |
dc.description.version | Chapter 6 'Cost-benefit analysis and public engagement' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'Democratic accountability in stressful times : when decisions must be made quickly' (2023) in the journal 'Penn State journal of law & international affairs'. | en |