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Title:Two logics of indirect governance : delegation and orchestration Author(s):ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; GENSCHEL, Philipp
; SNIDAL, Duncan; ZANGL, Bernhard
Date:2016Citation:
- British journal of political science, 2016, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 719-729
Type:ArticleAbstract:This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a ...



Title:International organizations as orchestrators Editor(s):ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; GENSCHEL, Philipp
; SNIDAL, Duncan; ZANGL, Bernhard
Date:2015Citation:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015
Type:BookAbstract:International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries - including ...


Title:Orchestrating global governance : from empirical findings to theoretical implications Author(s):ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; GENSCHEL, Philipp
; SNIDAL, Duncan; ZANGL, Bernhard
Date:2015Citation:
- Kenneth W. ABBOTT, Philipp GENSCHEL, Duncan SNIDAL and Bernhard ZANGL (eds), International organizations as orchestrators, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 349-379
Type:Contribution to book



Title:Orchestration : global governance through intermediaries Author(s):ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; GENSCHEL, Philipp
; SNIDAL, Duncan; ZANGL, Bernhard
Date:2015Citation:
- Kenneth W. ABBOTT, Philipp GENSCHEL, Duncan SNIDAL and Bernhard ZANGL (eds), International organizations as orchestrators, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 3-36
Type:Contribution to book



Title:Competence versus control : the governor’s dilemma Author(s):ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; GENSCHEL, Philipp
; SNIDAL, Duncan; ZANGL, Bernhard
Date:2020Citation:
- Regulation & governance, 2020, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 619-636
Type:ArticleAbstract:Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which ...


