dc.contributor.author | SADURSKI, Wojciech | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-23T12:33:38Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-02-23T12:33:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.citation | European Law Journal, 2008, 14, 1, 1-35 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1351-5993 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/8146 | |
dc.description.abstract | Soon after the accession of eight post-communist states from Central and
Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned
the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of
their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of
democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well-known pattern of behaviour
favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a
‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with
paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the
EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in
post-communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very
grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the
‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their
position vis-à-vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and
independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/6420 | |
dc.title | ‘Solange, chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe-Democracy- European Union | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.description.version | Published version of EUI WP LAW 2006/40 | |