dc.description.abstract | In this paper an attempt is made to show that evolutionary theory may be used to define the
goals of law. While addressing the problem of defining the goals of law, one can use
evolutionary theory in two radically different ways. First, one can reason from the empirical
observation that evolution operated according to the principle of the survival of the fittest to the
normative conclusion that survival of the fittest is good and therefore ought to be the main goal
of law. This approach – characteristic for Social Darwinists – cannot be sustained because it
commits the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” and it leads to conclusions that are entirely at odds
with our basic moral intuitions. Second, one may proceed in a less simplistic way, by, first,
trying to identify the view of human nature implied by evolutionary theory, and, subsequently,
reflecting on which political-philosophical conception this evolutionary view of human nature
can be said to underlie. Given that each political-philosophical conception determines directly
or indirectly the goals of law, it can be said that evolutionary theory, by influencing the choice
of a political-philosophical conception, indirectly determines the goals of law. This second
approach seems to me much more promising. In developing this approach, I divide my analysis
into three steps. First, I define the notion of a view of human nature. I argue that a view of
human nature is to provide answers to two main questions: what is the main moral motive of our
actions; what is the dominant mode of our actions. I defend the claim that evolutionary
psychology leads to a view of human nature according to which human beings are narrowly
altruistic and imperfectly rational. I call this evolutionary view of human nature “moderately
optimistic”. Third, I argue that this view is incompatible with such political-philosophical
conceptions as anarchism, marxism, and right-wing libertarianism, and is compatible with
liberalism and socialism. This argumentation, if correct, implies that although evolutionary
theory cannot provide a unique answer to the question of what the goals of law should be, it can
at least eliminate some potential goals of law as unacceptable.. | en |