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dc.contributor.authorMARIMON, Ramon
dc.contributor.authorQUADRINI, Vincenzo
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-28T09:26:08Z
dc.date.available2008-05-28T09:26:08Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/8712
dc.description.abstractWe develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. We show that a lack of contract enforceability amplifies the effect of barriers to competition on human capital accumulation. High barriers reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital by lowering the outside value of ‘skilled workers’, while low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This over-accumulation can be socially optimal if there are positive knowledge spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for significant cross-country income inequality.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008/19en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectLimited commitmenten
dc.subjectlimited enforcementen
dc.subjecthuman capital accumulationen
dc.subjectincome inequalityen
dc.subjectinnovationen
dc.subjectbarriers to competitionen
dc.titleCompetition, Human Capital and Income Inequality with Limited Commitmenten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorMARIMON|Ramon|aut|EUI70009
dc.neeo.contributorQUADRINI|Vincenzo|aut|
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