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dc.contributor.authorHERITIER, Adrienne
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-17T12:04:13Z
dc.date.available2012-04-17T12:04:13Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Common Market Studies, 2012, 50, S1, 38-54en
dc.identifier.issn1468-5965
dc.identifier.issn0021-9886
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/21614
dc.descriptionArticle first published online: 9 Feb 2012en
dc.description.abstractThis article explains how institutional rules change after they have been established in two important areas of European decision-making: co-decision and comitology. It shows how legislation under co-decision was transformed into fast-track legislation and why the Parliament gradually – between treaty reforms – gained more institutional power in comitology. The rational choice institutionalist explanation applied here focuses on the efficiency increasing/transaction cost saving aspects of interstitial institutional change, but also on the question of who gains and who loses in power under specific rules and how power may subsequently be shifted. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical considerations are subject to empirical (dis)confirmation on the basis of quantitative and qualitative empirical data collected on co-decision and delegation over time. The conclusion summarizes the argument and explores the applicability of the explanations to two other polities of regional integration: North Atlantic Free Trade Association (Nafta) and Mercosur (the Common Southern Market).en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe research was funded by the European University Institute, the Swedish Institute for European Studies in Stockholm and the British Economic and Social Research Council.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleInstitutional Change in Europe: Co-decision and comitology transformeden
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02226.x


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