Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDAWSON, Mark
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-24T13:48:26Z
dc.date.available2012-09-24T13:48:26Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationCambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, Studies in European law and policyen
dc.identifier.isbn9781107006324
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/23916
dc.description.abstractThe development of non-binding new governance methods has challenged the traditional ideals of EU law by suggesting that soft norms and executive networks may provide a viable alternative. Rather than see law and new governance as oppositional projects, Mark Dawson argues that new governance can be seen as an example of legal 'transformation', in which soft norms and hard law institutions begin to cohabit and interact. He charts this transformation by analysing the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) for Social Inclusion and Protection. While this process illustrates some of the concrete advantages for EU social policy which new governance has brought, it also illustrates their extensive legitimacy challenges. Methods like the OMC have both excluded traditional institutions, such as Courts and Parliaments, and altered the boundaries of domestic constitutional frameworks. The book concludes with some practical suggestions for how a political 'constitutionalisation' of new governance could look.en
dc.description.tableofcontents--Introduction --The origins of an Open Method of Coordination --Relating governance and law --Governance as proceduralisation --The case of the OMC SPSI --Constitutionalising new governance --The future of the Open Method of Coordination --Bibliography --Indexen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/12702en
dc.titleNew Governance and the Transformation of European Law: Coordinating EU social law and policyen
dc.typeBooken
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.description.versionPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 2009en


Files associated with this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record