Institutional design of democratic conditionality in regional organizations
Title: Institutional design of democratic conditionality in regional organizations
Author: CLOSA, Carlos
Series/Number: EUI RSCAS; 2013/45; Global Governance Programme-54
Democratic conditionality accession clauses have become increasingly common in certain international organisations. Similarly, provisions on suspension of membership because of breaches of democratic order have emerged. Why do regional organisations introduce these kin of clauses? In most cases, they developed after 1989 in a new geopolitical climate in which democratic ideals acquired normative hegemony. This does not exclude a purposive rational institutional design. On the one hand, accession clauses developed a posteriori of the creation of the organization being applied hence to new members rather to the ones creating them. These clauses have been used as an instrument for fostering clubness and imposing institutional features of applying states. On the other hand, in the case of suspension, institutional design serves to trade-off two competing principles: commitment to democratic conditionality and respect for sovereignty of member states and it does so by leaving wide discretion in implementing provisions for suspension clauses.
Subject: Institutional design; Comparative regional integration; Democratization
Type of Access: openAccess; openAccess