dc.contributor.author | ROBALO, Pedro | |
dc.contributor.author | SCHRAM, Arthur | |
dc.contributor.author | SONNEMANS, Joep | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-01-16T08:23:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-01-16T08:23:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of economic psychology, 2017, Vol. 62, pp. 130-154 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-4870 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/50184 | |
dc.description | Published online: 24 June 2017 | en |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents an experimental study on the relationship between other-regarding preferences, in-group bias and political participation. We conjecture that subjects who are more other-regarding and exhibit higher in-group bias are more likely to bear the costs of participating in group action. Using a participation game, we implement laboratory elections in which two groups compete for victory. We induce different levels of in-group bias across subjects in order to implement treatments in which the competing groups are either highly biased towards the own group vis-à-vis the other one or are characterized by low levels of such in-group bias. Our results show that, at the aggregate level, participation is higher in environments where in-group bias is more pronounced. Furthermore, the least other-regarding subjects participate much less often that others, while the more other-regarding sustain high participation levels. These findings suggest that interpersonal preferences and intergroup bonds can explain the higher participation of close-knit (political) groups observed in the field. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of economic psychology | en |
dc.title | Other-regarding preferences, in-group bias and political participation : an experiment | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.joep.2017.04.009 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 62 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 130 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 154 | |
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