Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?

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dc.contributor.author ELUL, Ronel
dc.contributor.author GOTTARDI, Piero
dc.date.accessioned 2008-12-10T12:14:04Z
dc.date.available 2008-12-10T12:14:04Z
dc.date.issued 2008
dc.identifier.issn 1725-6704
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1814/9974
dc.description.abstract In many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers’ past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We analyze its effects on borrowers’ incentives and access to credit, and identify conditions under which it is optimal. We argue that “forgetting” must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government. Our model’s predictions are consistent with the cross-country relationship between credit bureau regulations and provision of credit, as well as the evidence on the impact of these regulations on borrowers’ and lenders’ behavior. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher European University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries EUI ECO en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2008/41 en
dc.subject Bankruptcy en
dc.subject Information en
dc.subject Incentives en
dc.subject Fresh Start en
dc.subject D86 en
dc.subject G33 en
dc.subject K35 en
dc.title Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget? en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.neeo.contributor ELUL|Ronel|aut|
dc.neeo.contributor GOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
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