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dc.contributor.authorELUL, Ronel
dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-10T12:14:04Z
dc.date.available2008-12-10T12:14:04Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/9974
dc.description.abstractIn many countries, lenders are restricted in their access to information about borrowers’ past defaults. We study this provision in a model of repeated borrowing and lending with moral hazard and adverse selection. We analyze its effects on borrowers’ incentives and access to credit, and identify conditions under which it is optimal. We argue that “forgetting” must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government. Our model’s predictions are consistent with the cross-country relationship between credit bureau regulations and provision of credit, as well as the evidence on the impact of these regulations on borrowers’ and lenders’ behavior.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008/41en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectBankruptcyen
dc.subjectInformationen
dc.subjectIncentivesen
dc.subjectFresh Starten
dc.subjectD86en
dc.subjectG33en
dc.subjectK35en
dc.titleBankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorELUL|Ronel|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorGOTTARDI|Piero|aut|EUI70004
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