Open Access
An economic analysis of the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts
Loading...
Files
RSCAS_2013_08.pdf (930.91 KB)
OA 2013/08
License
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1028-3625
Issue Date
Type of Publication
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
EUI RSCAS; 2013/08; Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy
Cite
SAUSSIER, Stéphane, An economic analysis of the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts, EUI RSCAS, 2013/08, Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/26058
Abstract
Because concession contracts are long-term agreements that are inherently incomplete, the economic literature suggests that rigid award rules are inadequate. We suggest that the Directive should contain a right mix of flexible and rigid rules, as well as procedures to increase transparency and accountability of contracting parties. This briefing note provides suggestions in order to avoid the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the award of concession contracts.