An economic analysis of the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts

dc.contributor.author	SAUSSIER, Stéphane
dc.date.accessioned	2013-02-26T11:40:06Z
dc.date.available	2013-02-26T11:40:06Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.description.abstract	Because concession contracts are long-term agreements that are inherently incomplete, the economic literature suggests that rigid award rules are inadequate. We suggest that the Directive should contain a right mix of flexible and rigid rules, as well as procedures to increase transparency and accountability of contracting parties. This briefing note provides suggestions in order to avoid the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the award of concession contracts.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	1028-3625
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1814/26058
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	EUI RSCAS	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2013/08	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy	en
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Concession contracts	en
dc.subject	Awarding issues	en
dc.subject	Closure of markets	en
dc.title	An economic analysis of the closure of markets and other dysfunctions in the awarding of concession contracts	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication
eui.subscribe.skip	true
person.identifier.orcid	0000-0003-0166-3941
person.identifier.other	36793
relation.isAuthorOfPublication	64a8c27a-41d1-41b8-b42e-03d64b925912
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery	64a8c27a-41d1-41b8-b42e-03d64b925912