Open Access
Governance by conditionality : EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe
Loading...
Files
Schimmelfennig2004Sedelmeier_GovernanceAcceptVersion.pdf (116.95 KB)
Full-text in Open Access, Accepted Version
License
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
1350-1763; 1466-4429
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Author(s)
Citation
Journal of European public policy, 2004, Vol. 11, No 4, pp. 661-679
Cite
SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank, SEDELMEIER, Ulrich, Governance by conditionality : EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European public policy, 2004, Vol. 11, No 4, pp. 661-679 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/71646
Abstract
In the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of conditionality: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality.