Governance by conditionality : EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe

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dc.contributor.authorSCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank
dc.contributor.authorSEDELMEIER, Ulrich
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-15T13:42:42Z
dc.date.available2021-06-15T13:42:42Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractIn the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of conditionality: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationJournal of European public policy, 2004, Vol. 11, No 4, pp. 661-679en
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/1350176042000248089
dc.identifier.endpage679en
dc.identifier.issn1350-1763
dc.identifier.issn1466-4429
dc.identifier.issue4en
dc.identifier.startpage661en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/71646
dc.identifier.volume11en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.orcid.uploadtrue*
dc.publisherRoutledgeen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of European public policyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleGovernance by conditionality : EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europeen
dc.typeArticleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
person.identifier.other28582
relation.isAuthorOfPublication69c0b282-5061-4752-92bd-91172c22b34a
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery69c0b282-5061-4752-92bd-91172c22b34a
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