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dc.contributor.authorTRAUSCHWEIZER, Ingo
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-22T09:33:45Z
dc.date.available2009-06-22T09:33:45Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/11674
dc.description.abstractThis essay discusses how the U.S. Army proved its utility for the nuclear age in the wake of the Korean War. It specifically addresses the rationale behind the reorganization of U.S. Army formations into pentomic divisions between 1955 and 1959. It argues that the pentomic division was the cornerstone of a transformation. Its architect, General Maxwell Taylor, intended to transform the Army to a dual-capable conventional and atomic fighting force. He believed that this offered him the opportunity to alter national strategy from perceived over-reliance on nuclear deterrence to flexible and proportional response. The paper concludes that while Taylor’s pentomic transformation must be seen as a failure on the operational and tactical levels, it did indeed contribute significantly to the subsequent shift from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/19en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectUnited Statesen
dc.subjectarmyen
dc.subjectCold Waren
dc.subjectdefense policyen
dc.subjectstrategyen
dc.subjectlimited waren
dc.subjectdeterrenceen
dc.titleNuclear Weapons and Limited War: The U.S. Army in the 1950sen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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