Explaining the politics of compliance ad hoc justice in Serbia and Croatia

Abstract

This thesis attempts to explain the erratic record of compliance with EU and US demands for ‘full cooperation’ with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): where both Serbia and Croatia sometimes complied, regularly stalled and often resisted ICTY demands. Further, protracted delays and outright resistance was often exercised in the face of - or in spite of - EU membership conditionality as well as US financial assistance and sanctions. The period of assessment is post-2000, after the fall of both the Milosevic regime in Serbia and the Tudjman regime in Croatia. The key research questions are: How do we best explain the changing pattern of ICTY cooperation and compliance in Post-Milosevic Serbia and Post- Tudjman Croatia? How was it that governments sometimes complied, while at other times resisted cooperation with the ICTY? The Serbian and Croatian cases provide a challenge for conventional IR assumptions regarding the practice of political influence (international theory), the meaning of political compliance (conceptualization) and the study of political action (methodology). Each of these theoretical dimensions is discussed in the opening chapters for the purpose of developing better analytical tools to study influence-making and compliance in international politics. Subsequently, the story of ICTY compliance in Serbia and Croatia is then explored in empirical chapters which identify political facets involved in the making of ICTY justice and ICTY compliance.