The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development in Local Government: Do Islamists Govern Differently?

Abstract

This paper investigates local government practices during the first tenure of office of the Islamist Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (PJD). We consider three cases of PJD governance, the towns of Ksar al-Kebir, Temara, and Oued Zem. We evaluate the performance of PJD mayors compared to their electoral promises and the average local governance in Morocco, marked by widespread clientelism, inefficiency, and detachment from the populace. We study the role of the program in PJD governance, the extent to which PJD mayors have been involved in corruption or have used clientelistic practices, the implementation of the party's proximity promise, and how PJD mayors have managed their budgets. Our analysis is based on qualitative and quantitative evidence gathered through field research in 2003, 2007, and 2008. We find that, generally, PJD mayors fare better on corruption and proximity as well as in increasing investment in their municipalities. At the same time, they have governed in the same type of ad-hoc coalitions built on the distribution of office and some evidence suggests that their governance has not been free from clientelistic practices. The increase in investment has been achieved through de-cumulation of reserves or through borrowing, for they have not succeeded in increasing tax collection, a sign of the limits to their efficacy.