dc.contributor.author | GUERCI, Eric | |
dc.contributor.author | RASTEGAR, Mohammad Ali | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-12-21T13:55:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-12-21T13:55:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/13011 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational
model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare
market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation
of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with
historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns
pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the
uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more
costly thus leading to higher price levels. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI RSCAS | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2009/69 | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Electricity markets | en |
dc.subject | agent-based computational economics | en |
dc.subject | auction design | en |
dc.subject | uniform auction | en |
dc.subject | discriminatory auction | en |
dc.subject | reinforcement learning | en |
dc.title | From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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