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dc.contributor.authorGUERCI, Eric
dc.contributor.authorRASTEGAR, Mohammad Ali
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-21T13:55:05Z
dc.date.available2009-12-21T13:55:05Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/13011
dc.description.abstractIn the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2009/69en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLoyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectElectricity marketsen
dc.subjectagent-based computational economicsen
dc.subjectauction designen
dc.subjectuniform auctionen
dc.subjectdiscriminatory auctionen
dc.subjectreinforcement learningen
dc.titleFrom Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Marketen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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