Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars
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1554-0626; 1554-0634
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Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, 4, 4, 279-313
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JACKSON, Matthew O., MORELLI, Massimo, Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, 4, 4, 279-313 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/13656
Abstract
We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve dove, hawk, and deterrent strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the probability of winning a war becomes more reactive to increased armament, the frequency of wars decreases. As it becomes increasingly possible to negotiate a credible settlement, the probability of peace increases, but the variance of armament levels increases and war becomes increasingly likely when negotiations break down.