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dc.contributor.authorCOOPER, Russell
dc.contributor.authorKEMPF, Hubert
dc.contributor.authorPELED, Dan
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-28T08:10:30Z
dc.date.available2010-04-28T08:10:30Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/13795
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies fiscal spillovers in a monetary union. The focus of the analysis is on the interaction between the fiscal policy of member countries (regions) and the central monetary authority. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of one country will inuence equilibrium wages and interest rates. Thus there are fiscal spillovers within a federation. The magnitude and direction of these spillovers, in particular the presence of a crowding out effect, can be inuenced by the choice of monetary policy rules. We find that there does not exist a monetary policy rule which completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in another. Some familiar policy rules, such as pegging an interest rate, can provide partial insulation.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010/20en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleInsulation Impossible: Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Unionen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.neeo.contributorPELED|Dan|aut|
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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