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dc.contributor.authorCHAN, William
dc.contributor.authorCOURTY, Pascal
dc.contributor.authorHAO, Li
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-19T12:46:55Z
dc.date.available2011-04-19T12:46:55Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Journal, 2009, 119, 534, 24-46
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/16415
dc.description.abstractIn a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants' efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing
dc.titleSuspense: Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests
dc.typeArticle
dc.neeo.contributorCHAN|William|aut|
dc.neeo.contributorCOURTY|Pascal|aut|EUI70003
dc.neeo.contributorHAO|Li|aut|
dc.identifier.volume119
dc.identifier.startpage24
dc.identifier.endpage46
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue534


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