| dc.contributor.author | ENNIS, Huberto M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | KEISTER, Todd | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-04-19T12:47:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-04-19T12:47:26Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Monetary Economics, 2010, 57, 4, 404-419 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0304-3932 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16454 | |
| dc.description.abstract | When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier Science Bv | |
| dc.subject | Bank runs | |
| dc.subject | Limited commitment | |
| dc.subject | Time consistency | |
| dc.subject | Suspension of convertibility | |
| dc.title | Banking Panics and Policy Responses | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.04.005 | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | ENNIS|Huberto M.|aut| | |
| dc.neeo.contributor | KEISTER|Todd|aut| | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 57 | |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 404 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 419 | |
| eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 4 | |