Electoral Systems and Public Spending
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, 2, 609-657
MILESI-FERRETTI, G. M., PEROTTI, Roberto, ROSTAGNO, M., Electoral Systems and Public Spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, 2, 609-657 - http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16566
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policy-making under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.
Cadmus permanent link: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16566
Full-text via DOI: 10.1162/003355302753650346
Publisher: MIT Press
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