Electoral Systems and Public Spending
License
Cadmus Permanent Link
Full-text via DOI
ISBN
ISSN
0033-5533
Issue Date
Type of Publication
Keyword(s)
LC Subject Heading
Other Topic(s)
EUI Research Cluster(s)
Initial version
Published version
Succeeding version
Preceding version
Published version part
Earlier different version
Initial format
Citation
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, 2, 609-657
Cite
MILESI-FERRETTI, G. M., PEROTTI, Roberto, ROSTAGNO, M., Electoral Systems and Public Spending, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117, 2, 609-657 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16566
Abstract
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are easier to target across social groups. We present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policy-making under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer (public good) spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems. The model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) systems when the share of transfer spending is high (low). After defining rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation, we find considerable support for our predictions.