The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies
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0002-8282
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American Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976
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CHARI, V. V., JONES, L. E., MARIMON, Ramon, The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies, American Economic Review, 1997, 87, 5, 957-976 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/16948
Abstract
In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes. The benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president's powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system. Our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.