Judging judges: from 'principal-agent theory' to 'constitutional justice' in multilevel 'judicial governance' of economic cooperation among citizens
Journal of international economic law, 2008, 11, 4, 827-884
PETERSMANN, Ernst-Ulrich, Judging judges: from 'principal-agent theory' to 'constitutional justice' in multilevel 'judicial governance' of economic cooperation among citizens, Journal of international economic law, 2008, 11, 4, 827-884 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/17361
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
How should citizens evaluate the ever more important case law of international economic courts and their sometimes inadequate responses (e.g. by investor-state arbitration) to 'the governance gaps created by globalization (which) provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation'?1 Section I recalls that the customary law requirement (as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) of settling 'disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes,... in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', including `universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (Preamble VCLT), reflects the constitutional functions of courts to interpret and apply law in conformity with 'rule of law', justice and human rights as constitutional restraints on the 'rule of men' and their 'rule by law'. Section II explains why some of the governance problems of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are due to power-oriented conceptions of 'principal-agent' relationships as.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/17361
Full-text via DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgn030
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