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dc.contributor.authorARGENTON, Cédric
dc.contributor.authorWILLEMS, Bert
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-05T15:10:15Z
dc.date.available2011-12-05T15:10:15Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/19497
dc.descriptionAn earlier version of this paper was published as TILEC discussion paper 2010-027, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1651112en
dc.description.abstractMany commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use purely financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives to a large buyer for more than his expected production level. This exclusionary scheme comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry and creating too much risk for the buyer. We further show that it can still be used when contracts are offered anonymously through a broker, as the incumbent can signal its identity by adjusting the contracting terms.en
dc.description.sponsorshipBert Willems’ work was funded under a Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship (PIEF-GA-2008-221085)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011/63en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLoyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policyen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectExclusionen
dc.subjectmonopolizationen
dc.subjectcontractsen
dc.subjectfinancial contractsen
dc.subjectderivativesen
dc.subjectrisk aversionen
dc.subjectspeculationen
dc.titleExclusion Through Speculationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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