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dc.contributor.authorOLIVIERO, Tommaso
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-11T10:19:05Z
dc.date.available2014-05-15T14:42:24Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2014en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/31157
dc.descriptionDefence date: 20 March 2014en
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Professor Nicola Pavoni, Università Bocconi (Supervisor); Professor Árpád Ábrahám, European University Institute; Professor Hans Degryse, University of Leuven; Professor Steven Ongena, University of Zurich.
dc.descriptionFirst made available online on 15 May 2014.
dc.description.abstractThis thesis consists of three manuscripts that analyze the role of financial intermediation in the Great Recession from both a microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective. Although these papers differ in the adopted methodologies, they share the idea that, to evaluate the real effects of the last recession, we need a deeper study of financial intermediation. The first chapter of this thesis is joint work with L. D'Aurizio and L. Romano. It documents the credit allocation by Italian banks following the failure of Lehman Brothers. The empirical analysis reveals that Italian family firms experienced a significantly smaller contraction in granted loans than non-family firms. It is showed that the difference in the amount of credit granted to family and non-family firms is related to an increased role for soft information in Italian banks' operations. The second chapter, joint work with D. Menno, quantifies the welfare effects of the drop in aggregate house prices for leveraged and un-leveraged households in the Great Recession. It features a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the U.S. economy and simulates the 2007-2009 Great Recession as a contemporaneous shock to the financial intermediation sector and aggregate income. The estimates show that borrowers lost significantly more in terms of welfare than savers. In counter-factual experiments it has showed that this loss is larger the higher the households' leverage. The third chapter documents the relation between bank performance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis and CEO monetary incentives in a cross-country analysis. Results suggest that the sensitivity of CEOs' stock-option portfolios to share prices (option delta) in 2006 have strong predictive power for ex-post bank performance. By exploiting the cross-country variability in financial regulation, results show that incentives to take risk given by stock options are stronger in countries with explicit deposit insurance and weaker restrictions on bank investments.en
dc.description.uriFirst made available online on 15 May 2014.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI PhD thesesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDepartment of Economicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.lcshIntermediation (Finance)en
dc.subject.lcshBanks and bankingen
dc.subject.lcshFinancial crisesen
dc.titleFinancial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issuesen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/11929
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.embargo.terms2014-04-12


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