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dc.contributor.authorRUDIGER, Jesper
dc.contributor.authorVIGIER, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-25T11:54:47Z
dc.date.available2014-09-25T11:54:47Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/32831
dc.description.abstractBy choosing whether or not to follow a financial expert’s advice, a privately informed trader implicitly screens the ability of this expert. We explore the performance of the resulting feedback mechanism. In the medium run, feedback may altogether break down, enabling experts of low ability to maintain a lasting reputation and affect prices durably. Yet in the long run, the market almost always learns experts’ true type. While prices get stuck in the medium run, they thus converge in the long run to the asset’s correct valuation.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014/22
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectInformational cascadesen
dc.subjectExpertsen
dc.subjectReputationen
dc.subjectAsset price bubblesen
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectD83en
dc.subjectD84en
dc.subjectG14en
dc.subjectG20en
dc.titlePundits and quacks : financial experts and market feedbacken
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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