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dc.contributor.authorABRAHAM, Arpad
dc.contributor.authorKOEHNE, Sebastian
dc.contributor.authorPAVONI, Nicola
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-15T14:45:31Z
dc.date.available2014-12-15T14:45:31Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33861
dc.description.abstractSeveral frictions restrict the government’s ability to tax assets. First, it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets. Second, agents can resort to nonobservable low-return assets such as cash, gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too high. This paper shows that limitations in asset taxation have important consequences for the taxation of labor income. Using a dynamic moral hazard model of social insurance, we find that optimal labor income taxes become less progressive when governments face limitations in asset taxation. We evaluate the quantitative effect of imperfect asset taxation for two applications of our model.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2014/14en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectOptimal income taxationen
dc.subjectCapital taxationen
dc.subjectProgressivityen
dc.subjectD82en
dc.subjectD86en
dc.subjectE21en
dc.subjectH21en
dc.titleOptimal income taxation with asset accumulationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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