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dc.contributor.authorCROON, Johanna
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-19T17:59:59Z
dc.date.available2014-12-19T17:59:59Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationEuropean law journal, 2013, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 153-173en
dc.identifier.issn1351-5993
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/33943
dc.description.abstractThe general principle of equality in European law is often held to be inconsistently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and insufficiently supported by methodology. Contrary to this assessment, this paper argues that there is substantial coherence and theoretical underpinning to the court's equality reasoning. First, it shows that the respective case-law can be subdivided into three groups, depending on the level of scrutiny applied. Second, it establishes that the prevailing accounts have difficulty in explaining the court's choice of scrutiny due to their limited selection of analytical parameters. Third, it concludes that comparative institutional analysis offers an alternative framework to make the ECJ's testing approaches in equality matters more intelligible.
dc.language.isoEn
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean law journal
dc.titleComparative institutional analysis, the European Court of Justice and the general principle of non-discrimination or alternative tales on equality reasoning
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/eulj.12018
dc.identifier.volume19
dc.identifier.startpage153
dc.identifier.endpage173
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2


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