The political economy of global competition law and policy : an institutional approach

Abstract

This paper argues that from an institutional political economy perspective the ICN essentially constitutes a product of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched as a reaction to the threat of a shift of power in the definition of competition law and policy at the global level and primarily aimed at keeping the hegemony of the OECD in this field. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it starts with an analysis of the evolution of the global institutional setting of competition law and policy with a focus on the emergence, in the 1990s, of bodies with a global dimension vested with responsibilities in competition law and policy that threatened the traditional preeminence of the OECD as a standard-setter in competition matters. The paper continues with an explanation of the ICN as a reaction to such threat. This argument is supported by the analysis of the process of creation of the ICN – launched and backed by OECD members – and of the internal rules governing its functioning – which have been devised so as to grant the OECD jurisdictions a privileged position within the ICN. The paper concludes with some considerations about the input- legitimacy and the output-legitimacy of the ICN, the rationale of the OECD’s ascendancy over the network, as well as some insights as regards the future of the ICN.