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dc.contributor.authorDALLE NOGARE, Chiara
dc.contributor.authorRICCIUTI, Roberto
dc.description.abstractAccording to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper
dc.titleTerm limits : do they really affect fiscal policy choices?
dc.typeWorking Paper

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