dc.contributor.author | DALLE NOGARE, Chiara | |
dc.contributor.author | RICCIUTI, Roberto | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-07T08:35:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-07-07T08:35:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/42339 | |
dc.description.abstract | According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CESifo Working Paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2008/2199 | en |
dc.relation.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244 | |
dc.title | Term limits : do they really affect fiscal policy choices? | |
dc.type | Working Paper | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |