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dc.contributor.authorSOLANO DIAZ , Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-15T14:39:12Z
dc.date.available2016-09-15T14:39:12Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationEuropean journal of legal studies, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 38-61en
dc.identifier.issn1973-2937
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/43285
dc.description.abstractWhile the proliferation of online markets has presented competition authorities with a string of challenges of diverse nature, the price parity phenomenon depicts particularly well the Commission's 'fight-chaos-with-chaos' approach to digital economy. Indeed, the EU watchdog's passive attitude towards the multiple enquiries into most-favoured-nation clausesby different national trustbusters across the Old Continent risks going down in universal history of antitrust infamy. With the awareness that rivers of ink have already been poured over the subject, this paper adopts a brand new stance by looking on its opportunity side. In the light of the timid open-mindedness recently shown by the European Court of Justice as regards the object-effect dichotomy in Groupement des Cartes Bancairesand Maxima Latvijajudgements (which seem to steer away from Pierre Fabre's sternness), I will discuss different national solutions with a view to vindicating not only a more consistent but also an unprejudiced effects-based approach that should transport analogue EU law enforcement to the digital era.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean journal of legal studiesen
dc.relation.urihttps://ejls.eui.eu/en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectDegree of harmen
dc.subjectMost-favoured-nation clausesen
dc.subjectNational competition authoritiesen
dc.subjectprice parity clausesen
dc.subjectrestrictions by effect and restrictions by objecten
dc.titlePrice parity clauses : has the Commission let slip the watchdogs of war?en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.volume9en
dc.identifier.startpage38en
dc.identifier.endpage61en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1en


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