Date: 2016
Type: Working Paper
Cooperative investment, access, and uncertainty
Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, 2016/61, Florence School of Regulation
BOURREAU, Marc, CAMBINI, Carlo, HOERNIG, Steffen, Cooperative investment, access, and uncertainty, EUI RSCAS, 2016/61, Florence School of Regulation - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/44084
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This paper compares the impacts of traditional one-way access obligations and the new regulatory scheme of co-investment on the roll-out of network infrastructures. We show that compulsory access leads to smaller roll-out, first because it reduces the returns from investment, and second because in the presence of uncertainty it provides access seekers with an option whose exercise hurts investors. Co-investment without access obligations leads to risk sharing and eliminates the access option, implying highest network coverage. Allowing for access on top of co-investment actually decreases welfare if the access price is low.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/44084
ISSN: 1028-3625
External link: http://fsr.eui.eu
Series/Number: EUI RSCAS; 2016/61; Florence School of Regulation